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EXTINCTION OF LEASES CONFUSIONE 
 
CRAIG ANDERSON* 
 
Introduction 
 
Suppose that the same person becomes both creditor and debtor in the same obligation. 
Perhaps the debtor has taken an assignation from the creditor of the right to enforce the 
obligation. Alternatively, it may be that the debtor has acquired the right to enforce the 
obligation through the law of succession, on the death of the creditor. It is settled law that, in 
such a situation, that obligation is normally extinguished by the doctrine of confusio.1 This is 
not simply a rule of Scots law. It is found in Roman law2 and in later systems based on it.3 
 This much is beyond question, and to say only this is to say something barely worth 
saying, both because the point is settled beyond debate and also because, in the simple case of 
a person becoming creditor or debtor to himself, it can hardly make any practical difference 
whether we say the right is extinguished. After all, this individual can hardly enforce the 
obligation against himself. Yet the number of reported cases on the doctrine of confusio tells a 
different story. Through them we find that, when we move beyond this simple scenario, 
difficulties rapidly emerge.  
 This article is not however about confusio in general, but about its application to a 
specific case of the application of the doctrine, namely leases. What happens if the landlord 
acquires the tenant's interest under the lease or, by contrast, if the tenant acquires the 
landlord's right? Textbook writers have been divided on the question of whether a lease is 
extinguished when the same person becomes both landlord and tenant and. Thus, for Rankine, 
there is "little if any doubt that the lease is extinguished",4 at least where the landlord acquires 
the tenant's interest. The converse case, where the tenant acquires ownership of the land to 
which the lease relates, is one of "greater difficulty...but in principle it would seem that the 
same rule must prevail".5 Others have taken the same view,6 or have at least inclined to the 
view.7 
 On the other hand, Paton and Cameron's view is that extinction confusione is "not 
invariably" the result of the same person becoming both landlord and tenant.8 Halliday9 and 
Gloag and Henderson10 go even further, and deny the application of confusio to leases 
altogether. 
                                      
* Lecturer in Law, Robert Gordon University. 
1 Stair, Inst 1.18.9; Erskine, Inst 3.4.23. 
2 Pomponius, D.46.3.107. Pomponius is talking here specifically about the extinction in such 
circumstances of the obligations arising from a contract of stipulatio, but this text is given by W W 
Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 3rd edn, rev P Stein (Cambridge: 
University Press), p. 563 and J A C Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (North Holland Publishing 
1976), p. 342 as authority for the general principle. See also Papinian, D.46.1.50; Terentius Clemens, 
D.34.3.21.1. 
3 For Roman-Dutch law, see e.g. H Grotius, The Jurisprudence of Holland (R W Lee (tr), 2 vols, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 3.40.4; for France, Code Civil art. 1300 gives this as the rule. 
4 J Rankine, A Treatise on the Law of Leases in Scotland 3rd edn (1916) 525. 
5 Rankine, Leases, 525. 
6 See e.g. R P Morison, "Confusio" in J L Wark (ed), Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, vol 4 
(Edinburgh: W Green & Son, 1927), para 890. 
7 C Waelde (ed), Professor McDonald's Conveyancing Opinions (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998), p. 
199. 
8 G C H Paton & J G S Cameron, The Law of Landlord and Tenant in Scotland (Edinburgh: Green 
1967), p. 102. 
9 D J Cusine (ed), The Conveyancing Opinions of Professor J M Halliday (Edinburgh: Green, 1992), 
pp. 377-381 
10 W M Gloag & R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland 13th edn, H L MacQueen & Rt Hon Lord Eassie 
eds (Edinburgh: W Green/Thomson Reuters, 2012), para 3.39. 
 The issue is of practical significance. If a lease is not extinguished when the same 
person becomes both landlord and tenant, it will continue in effect if the property is then 
conveyed to another person. Certainty is desirable in such cases. Of course, the difficulty 
could be avoided by means of an express renunciation of the lease, but that may not be 
thought of in time. Equally, if a registered lease is extinguished confusione, an inaccuracy will 
be created in the Land Register if action is not taken to remove the lease from the Register 
altogether, and this inaccuracy may mislead those relying on the Register. The effect of 
confusio on other parties’ rights would also have to be considered, as where the lease is 
burdened by a standard security or sub-lease. The latter possibility is particularly problematic 
from a practical point of view, as it may be that the sub-lease does not appear in the Register. 
 The primary purpose of this article is to determine, if possible, whether the doctrine 
of confusio applies to leases. If it does apply, it will be found that this raises certain further 
issues, which will also be considered. As it seems likely, though, that at least part of the 
answer will be found in the nature of confusio itself, we shall begin by considering confusio 
generally and how it operates. 
 
Confusio generally 
  
Scope: personal rights only? 
 
The simplest example of the operation of confusio is where the same person becomes both the 
person entitled to enforce a personal right and also the person bound to comply with it.11 It 
has been said that “confusio proper is applicable only to obligations which sound in a 
payment of money, [but] it has been extended by analogy to cases which do not directly come 
under that category”.12 
 O’Brien has made the argument, speaking specifically of servitudes, that there are 
theoretical difficulties with the application of the doctrine of confusio to real rights.13 The 
argument is that, in a real right, the relationship is not simply between an individual creditor 
and an individual debtor. The nature of real rights is to be enforceable, not against some 
particular person or persons, but against the whole world. In the case of a servitude, the 
burdened proprietor is not the only person bound; the rest of the world is bound as well. There 
is therefore no complete identification between creditor and debtor when the benefited 
proprietor in a servitude acquires the burdened property, or the burdened proprietor acquires 
the benefited property, and so confusio cannot apply. In particular, the servitude ought to be 
available to that person when he or she has no present right to natural possession of the 
burdened property, as for example where it is subject to a lease in favour of a third party.14  
 The theoretical attractions of O’Brien’s argument are undeniable, and certainly there 
may be exceptions to the operation of confusio, as we shall see below. Nonetheless, as 
O’Brien himself appears to accept, it is too late to argue for the general proposition that real 
rights are not subject to the doctrine of confusio. Although Stair does not appear to give 
                                      
11 W M Gloag & R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland 13th edn, H L MacQueen & Rt Hon Lord Eassie 
eds (Edinburgh: W Green/Thomson Reuters, 2012), para 3.39. 
12 Healy & Young v Mair’s Trs 1914 SC 893, 899 (Lord Johnston). 
13 P O'Brien, "The Extinction of Servitudes Through Confusion" 1995 SLT (News) 228. 
14 See though D A Brand et al, Professor McDonald's Conveyancing Manual 7th edn (Edinburgh: 
Tottel, 2004), para 18.62, where it is suggested that "the better view" is that the servitude is 
extinguished and "any residual entitlement held by the tenant to 'enforce' the servitude arises as a 
pertinent of the lease." See also D J Cusine & R R M Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way 
(Edinburgh: SULI/W Green 1998), para 17.30. This, however, does not address the question of 
continued enforcement by the landlord as owner of the benefited property, where the burdened property 
is leased. Hume is supportive of the view that a servitude may survive in such a case (D Hume, Baron 
David Hume’s Lectures, 1786-1822 (G C H Paton ed, Stair Society vols 5, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 1939-
1958), III,277). 
confusio as a ground for extinction of a servitude,15 Erskine,16 Bell,17 Bankton18 and Hume19 
do, and there is also case law confirming the point.20 This was the position in Roman law,21 
and has been accepted also in other jurisdictions influenced by the law of Rome.22 It has also 
been held that heritable securities are subject to extinction confusione.23 
 Even if O’Brien’s argument ought to be correct, though, the law has proceeded for 
too long on the contrary view, and communis error facit ius.24 There appears, therefore, to be 
no basis for the general proposition that confusio does not apply to real rights, although of 
course individual exceptions may exist. Whether is should so apply is, of course, a different 
question. There is a particular difficulty with registered real rights. Suppose that the owner of 
plot A holds a servitude over plot B, constituted in the title to plot A. If the two plots come 
into the same ownership, the servitude will be extinguished confusione. However, if the two 
plots should subsequently come into different ownership, future acquirers may be misled, for 
examination of the title to plot A will still appear to disclose the existence of the servitude.25 
The true situation could only be determined by an examination of the title to plot B, which 
would be onerous,26 and so not to be undertaken speculatively. Certainly, this is not standard 
practice. Arguably, therefore, the application of confusio to registered real rights in land 
reduces the reliability of the property registers. 
 
Basis of operation 
 
                                      
15 Stair 2.7.4 is concerned with extinction of servitudes, but discusses only renunciation and negative 
prescription. 
16 Erskine 2.9.37. 
17 Bell, Principles § 997. 
18 Bankton 2.7.37. 
19 Hume, Lectures III,276-277. 
20 See e.g. The Union Bank of Scotland Ltd v "The Daily Record" (Glasgow) Ltd (1902) 10 SLT 71. For 
general discussion of the application of confusio to servitudes, see Cusine & Paisley, Servitudes and 
Rights of Way, paras 17.22-17.31. 
21 Gaius, D.8.6.1. 
22 For Roman-Dutch law, see Grotius, Jurisprudence of Holland, 2.3.72; U Huber, The Jurisprudence 
of My Time (P Gane (tr), 2 vols, Durban: Butterworth, 1939) 2.45.3; J Voet, The Selective Voet, Being 
the Commentary on the Pandects (P Gane (tr), 8 vols, Durban: Butterworth, 1955-1958) 8.6.2. For 
France, see Code Civil art. 705. 
23 Robertson v Davidson (1751) Mor 3044; Hogg v Brack (1832) 11 S 198; Murray v Parlane's Tr 
(1890) 18 R 287. The case is of course easier to make with rights in security, as they cannot exist 
without a personal obligation which would, itself, presumably be extinguished confusione. 
24 Common error makes law. For the origins and development of this maxim, see W M Gordon, 
"Communis error facit ius" in A Burrows et al, Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of 
Earlsferry (Oxford: University Press, 2013). As Gordon points out, such a common error is not 
conclusive. Nonetheless, it is an important factor where a particular position has been acted on as 
correct, without contradiction, for an extended period. Thus, for example, see the observation of the 
Lord President in Graham v Gordon (1843) 5 D 1207 at p. 1210, concerning the disputed validity of an 
Act of Sederunt: "as it has been acted upon for nearly a century, we must give obedience to it." The 
particular error we are presently concerned with, if indeed error it be, has been acted on for many times 
longer than a century. 
25 This will inevitably be so if title to plot A is recorded in the Register of Sasines, that register being 
simply a register of deeds. In the Land Register, it would be possible for reference to the servitude to be 
deleted from the title sheet to plot A, but that would only happen if the Keeper was alerted to the 
extinction of the servitude. It is, of course, possible that the servitude would have been constituted 
anew by implication on the separation of ownership of plot A and plot B: Ewart v Cochrane (1861) 4 
Macq 117. However, that is not always the outcome. 
26 Indeed, in the case of property registered under the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979, it would 
often be impossible, there being no provision in that Act or in the relevant subordinate legislation for 
the consultation of previous versions of title sheets. The position is altered by the Land Registration etc 
(Scotland) Act 2012, section 2 of which directs the Keeper to maintain an “archive record” as part of 
the Land Register, which will contain information on registered titles in their earlier states. 
Few writers appear to have given much consideration to the basis on which confusio operates, 
most simply stating that it exists and outlining its scope.27 Yet such consideration seems 
essential to understanding the nature of confusio and, by extension, defining its scope and 
operation. The tendency, where the question of the basis of confusio is considered at all, is 
simply to dismiss the possibility of the same person being both creditor and debtor in the 
same obligation as a "clear absurdity"28 or an "impossibility".29 On this view, the operation of 
confusio is seen as a legal necessity. The idea of the same person being at once creditor and 
debtor in the same obligation is, it is said, simply contrary to the nature of an obligation. A 
person just cannot, as Lord Wood puts it, "to any intelligible purpose, be both debtor and 
creditor to himself".30 Thus, for example, Erskine states baldly that "no person can be creditor 
or debtor to himself".31 This is not simply a matter of Scots law, this view being mirrored by 
writers outside Scotland.32 
 This position will be referred to in this article as the "legal necessity view" of 
confusio, being based as it is on the idea that confusio necessarily operates to extinguish 
obligations when the same person is both creditor and debtor. This is the view that the law 
simply cannot accommodate the same person as both creditor and debtor in the same 
obligation. In Scotland, the leading authority for the legal necessity view is the opinion of 
Lord Kinnear in Motherwell v Manwell:33 
 
“confusion does not operate either payment or discharge. It prevents the possibility of 
a debt arising. It extinguishes the jus crediti. From the moment that the inconsistent 
characters of debtor and creditor are combined in the same person both debtor and 
creditor cease to exist; there is no longer any debt or any relation of debtor and 
creditor at all”. 
 
 The legal necessity view of confusio is intuitively attractive. Undoubtedly, the idea of 
the same person being both creditor and debtor in the same obligation is a decidedly odd one. 
However, the law is not a system of pure logic, "contrived by metaphysicians...and [we] must 
not expect to find everywhere the beauty and harmony of a Philosophical System."34 This is 
not a call to abandon principle in favour of pure pragmatism. Rather, it is a recognition that 
principle may easily become dogma, and that inconvenient results of the application of 
principle can quite properly lead us to reconsider what principle requires in a given case. This 
reconsideration may lead us to the view that the established view is incorrect, and must be 
replaced or adjusted. Principle must be subject to adjustment in the light of experience. If it 
should suit the ends of the law that, in certain cases, an obligation be allowed to continue to 
                                      
27 See e.g. Gloag & Henderson, The Law of Scotland, para 3.39. 
28 C Bury & D Bain, "A, B and C to A, revisited" 2013 Jur Rev 77, at p. 79, considering the specific 
issue of the application of confusio to leases. 
29 R Saleilles, Étude sur la Théorie Générale de l'Obligation (1925, reprinted Paris: La Mémoire du 
Droit, 2001), para 73, referring to "le principle de l'impossibilité d'être à la fois créancier et débiteur 
de la même obligation" (the principle of the impossibility of being at once creditor and debtor in the 
same obligation). See also R J Pothier, Treatise on the Law of Obligations, Or Contracts (W D Evans 
trans, Philadelphia: Robert H Small, 1826), p. 381: “it is impossible to be both [creditor and debtor] at 
once”. 
30 Elder v Watson (1859) 21 D 1122 at p. 1128 (Lord Wood, giving the opinion of the court). 
31 Erskine 3.4.23. Stair's statement (at Inst. 1.18.9), in almost identical terms, that "none can be creditor 
or debtor to himself", gives little support to Erskine's view, however, as Stair's view is that confusio 
operates merely a suspension of obligations rather than an extinction. The obligation, therefore, 
continues to exist on Stair's view. 
32 See, for example, F Terré, P Simler & Y Lequette, Droit civil: Les obligations (10th edn, Paris: 
Dalloz, 2009), para 1411; Huber, Jurisprudence of My Time, 3.41.1; R Zimmermann, The Law of 
Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford: University Press 1990, reprinted 
1996), 759; B Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (9th edn by T Kipp, 3 vols, Frankfurt am 
Main: Rüten & Leoning, 1906), § 352. 
33 (1903) 5 F 619 at p. 631. 
34 Hume, Lectures, I,6-7. 
exist notwithstanding that the same person is both creditor and debtor, and there is no 
practical disadvantage in allowing this, a principle that will not bend to allow this ceases to be 
an aid to legal reasoning and becomes an obstacle. In fact, the legal necessity view suffers 
from just this weakness. As we shall see below, there are various situations in which a right 
has been allowed to continue in existence notwithstanding that the same person is both 
creditor and debtor. As we shall see, the reasoning used to justify these exceptions is not 
always entirely convincing. The point for the moment, though, is this: it is no difficult matter 
to find arguments in the case law for the non-application of confusio to particular facts. It is a 
strange kind of "absurdity" or "impossibility" that admits so readily of exceptions as confusio 
does. If it is absurd to have the same person both creditor and debtor in the same obligation in 
the same capacity, that absurdity is not lessened in those cases where, for one reason or 
another, confusio does not apply. The alleged absurdity arises from the identity of creditor 
and debtor, and that factor is still present where an exception applies. Nonetheless, in those 
exceptional cases the law is able to accommodate the absurdity. The implication of this is that 
the continued existence of an obligation, in circumstances where the same person is both 
creditor and debtor, is less problematic in principle than such terms as "absurdity" and 
"impossibility" imply. Whether they are accepted in the particular case or not, an argument 
has often been found that confusio should not operate that can, at the very least, be classified 
as an "intelligible purpose", to adopt Lord Wood's words. As we shall see, even Erskine, 
despite his bluntness on the general point, allows exceptions to the operation of confusio. 
 There is an alternative view, expressed by Lord McLaren in Motherwell v Manwell, 
holding that where the same person becomes both creditor and debtor in the same obligation, 
"payment is effected by operation of law".35 Lord Kinnear appears to be alluding to this view 
when, in the text from the same case that is quoted above, he says that "confusion does not 
operate either payment or discharge". Bell's view appears to be the same as Lord McLaren's. 
He holds that, where confusio operates in relation to a debt, it is "satisfied and extinguished". 
The word "satisfied" appears to imply some form of deemed payment or discharge of the 
debt. The alternative view, then, is that confusio does not operate by legal necessity. Instead, 
it is a form of deemed payment or, in cases where the right is not a right to payment of 
money, deemed discharge of the right. Again, Rankine relates confusio to renunciation of a 
lease as a "kindred mode of extinguishing a lease", holding that the acquisition by the 
landlord of the tenant's interest is "in other words [the acceptance of] a renunciation".36  
 This second view will be referred to in this article as the "deemed discharge view" of 
confusio. The advantage of the deemed discharge view is that it more readily allows for 
exceptions to the operation of confusio where that is considered appropriate. By contrast, the 
legal necessity view becomes difficult to sustain if exceptions are recognised. 
 There has been some acceptance of the deemed discharge view outside Scotland. 
Thus, Buckland regards confusio as a case of "automatic payment".37 Again, Grotius says of 
the case where the same person becomes both creditor and debtor through succession that the 
heir to the deceased is "taken to pay himself, or to receive payment from himself".38 
 The present author is inclined to prefer the deemed discharge view of confusio as 
reflecting the current state of the law more accurately and as allowing greater flexibility in 
future development. The argument is straightforward. The legal necessity view of confusio is 
based on the proposition that it is impossible for the same person to be at once both creditor 
and debtor in the same obligation in the same capacity. If there is a single exception to the 
operation of confusio, which cannot be justified on other grounds, then it is not impossible for 
the same person to be both creditor and debtor. The proposition on which the legal necessity 
view is based is thus falsified, and as a result the legal necessity view must be incorrect. It 
                                      
35 (1903) 5 F 619 at p. 629. Lord McLaren's opinion in this case was a dissenting one. However, the 
basis of his dissent does not seem relevant to this point. 
36 Rankine, Leases, 525. 
37 Buckland, Text-Book of Roman Law, pp. 563-564. 
38 Grotius, Jurisprudence of Holland, 3.40.5. 
will be argued below that there is sufficient basis in the authorities to hold that at least one 
such exception to confusio exists. 
 
When does confusio apply? 
 
It is clear that confusio will not always operate to extinguish a right. Indeed, Stair’s view 
appears to have been that confusio did not operate to extinguish rights at all: “confusion is not 
an absolute extinction, but rather a suspension of obligations.”39 On this view, the right is not 
extinguished and, although it is in abeyance while the same person is both creditor and debtor, 
it will revive if the two interests are separated again. However, Stair’s view has not been 
accepted by other institutional writers. Erskine says merely that extinction will not occur in 
every case: 
 
“Confusio hath not always the effect of a total and perpetual extinction of a debt or 
right. Sometimes it produces only a temporary suspension of it, while the debtor and 
creditor continue one and the same person...But when the succession of these rights 
happens again to divide in two, the obligation or right, which lay for a while sunk or 
dormant confusione, revives, and recovers its first force".40 
 
Erskine therefore distinguishes between cases where the right is extinguished and cases where 
it is merely suspended. However, notwithstanding the approval of the idea of suspension by 
such high authorities as Stair and Erskine, and also by Bell,41 it has been said that  
 
"cases of supposed temporary suspension are not exceptions to the rule, but are cases 
to which the doctrine of confusio does not apply".42 
 
This may be the better view. Of course, it will usually make no practical difference whether 
the right is suspended or not while the same person is both creditor and debtor: even if the 
right continues to be theoretically enforceable, the holder of the right can hardly enforce it 
against himself. However, the view that cases where the right is not extinguished outright are 
cases where confusio simply does not apply allows us to account for those exceptional cases 
where it is desirable to allow for continued enforcement of the right. An example of such a 
case would be that considered above, of a servitude continuing to be enforceable where the 
burdened property was occupied by a tenant. 
 The question then arises, when will confusio not apply to extinguish a right? One 
example is where entailed land is burdened by debts, the right to payment of which has a 
different destination. This exception to the operation of confusio is well established.43 
However, this is hardly a topic of current concern.44 More generally, Nicolson, in his notes to 
Erskine’s Institutes,45 suggests that a distinction can be drawn between rights acquired mortis 
causa and those acquired inter vivos. In the former case, he suggests, there is a presumption 
against confusio, "if the creditor has any interest to keep up the debt". Where the right is 
acquired inter vivos, confusio is presumed, even with such an interest. It is not clear that this 
                                      
39 Stair 1.18.9. 
40 Erskine 3.4.27. 
41 Bell, Principles, § 580. 
42 Healy & Young's Tr v Mair's Tr 1914 SC 893, 902 (Lord President). 
43 Cuninghame v Cardross (1680) Mor 3038; Crawford v Hotchkis 11 March 1809, FC; Lawrie v 
Donald (1830) 9 S 147; Welsh v Barstow (1837) 15 S 537; Macalister v Macalister (1865) 4 M 245; 
Cuming v Irvine (1726) Mor 3042; Colville's Trs v Marindin 1908 SC 911; Erskine 3.4.27; Bankton 
1.24.43. Stair 1.18.9 gives the same rule, but not as an exception to the general operation of confusio. 
Instead, for him this is an example of confusio operating as suspension of obligations only, rather than 
as extinction. 
44 All remaining entails were removed by the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc (Scotland) Act 2000, s. 
50. 
45 At 3.4.27. 
is borne out by the cases he cites, however. The idea certainly does not seem to be mentioned 
in any of them. Thus, in Elder v Watson,46 a debt was extinguished confusione on the debtor 
succeeding to the creditor's right. This was a succession case, but no issue was made of that. 
Indeed, of the other cases Nicolson cites, Duke of Roxburgh v Wauchope47 seems not even to 
be a confusio case, instead being a case where a wadset was expressly renounced on the same 
person becoming both creditor and debtor. It is in any case difficult to see why such a 
distinction as Nicolson suggests should exist. 
 From the authorities, four situations may be identified where it is possible that 
confusio will not operate.48 
 
(i) Debtor and creditor in different capacities 
 
Confusio does not operate where the roles of debtor and creditor are held in different 
capacities. For example, a right held in the capacity of a beneficiary of a trust is not 
extinguished by the mere fact that the same person is also a trustee, nor would debts owed by 
a deceased person be extinguished by virtue alone of the fact that the creditor was the 
executor of the deceased debtor.49 Likewise, there is no problem with a partner in a 
partnership holding a right against the firm.50 Again, where a cautioner acquires the creditor's 
right, the principal debt is not extinguished, and can continue to be enforced against the 
principal debtor.51 The point seems to be that a cautioner is only a debtor in a limited sense, 
and so is not creditor and debtor in the same capacity. This may also be the justification for 
the rule that confusio does not apply where entailed land is burdened with debts, the right to 
payment of which has a different destination.52 
 This is the best established of the exceptions to the operation of confusio, and can be 
readily reconciled with both the legal necessity view of confusio and the deemed discharge 
view. After all, if a person becomes creditor and debtor in different capacities, then the 
interests of debtor and creditor do not fully coincide. Its application, though, may not have 
been justified in King v Johnston.53 In that case, a builder named Riddagh granted a right in 
security over an area of ground in favour of a Mr Aitken. A subsequent security was granted 
by Riddagh in favour of a Mr and Mrs King. Riddagh then granted a disposition in favour of 
Aitken which was ex facie absolute, but which was qualified by an unrecorded back letter in 
which Aitken acknowledged that he held the subjects in security only. The nature of ex facie 
absolute dispositions has been disputed.54 In this case, though, it was said that: 
 
                                      
46 (1859) 21 D 1122. 
47 (1825) 1 W & S 41. 
48 This is not necessarily exhaustive. For example, the application of confusio to real burdens is 
excluded by statute: Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003, s. 19. 
49 The theoretical argument would be that the rights and obligations of a trust form a separate 
patrimony or estate from that of each individual trustee. For the theory of separate patrimonies, see K G 
C Reid, “National Report for Scotland” in D J Hayton, S C J J Kortman & H L E Verhagen, Principles 
of European Trust Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), pp. 68-69; G L Gretton, "Trust 
and Patrimony" in H L MacQueen (ed), Scots Law into the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of W A 
Wilson (Edinburgh: Green, 1996); G L Gretton, "Trusts without Equity"  (2000) 49 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 599. 
50 Mair v Wood 1948 SC 83 at p. 86 (Lord President). 
51 Stair, Inst 1.18.9; Erskine, Inst 3.4.24; Bell, Principles, § 580. 
52 Macalister v Macalister (1865) 4 M 245 at p. 249 (Lord President) and p. 250 (Lord Deas); 
McKenzie v Gordon (1837) 16 S 311 at p. 322 (Lord President); Lord Blantyre v Dunn (1858) 20 D 
1188 at p. 1195 (Lord Ivory). From the point of view of principle, one may doubt whether this is an 
accurate characterisation of the interests involved. However, the rule itself is too well supported by 
authority to be doubted. 
53 1908 SC 684. 
54 For discussion of the issues, see G L Gretton, "Radical Rights and Radical Wrongs" 1986 Jur Rev 51 
and 192, especially at pp. 54-57 and 201-209.  
"Aitken was really holding as a quasi trustee for behoof of Riddagh...And it was 
Riddagh who still remained the true proprietor of the subjects, because it was he who 
had the radical right thereto, and who had an interest in the reversion. That being so, 
it appears to me that confusio cannot be held to have taken place, because Aitken was 
never truly the absolute proprietor of the subjects over which the bonds were granted, 
but only an encumbrancer."55 
 
If this view is correct, then it would properly exclude the operation of confusio. However, 
there is an alternative view, that the disponee of an ex facie absolute disposition does acquire 
ownership, with the disponer being left with only a personal right against the disponee, 
entitling the disponer to have the property reconveyed on payment of the debt. This was the 
view taken in the more recent case Sexton v Coia.56 The decision in Sexton v Coia certainly 
seems the more consistent with property law principles. It is also, as Gretton points out,57 the 
view with greater support from the case law. However, the issue is now largely academic, ex 
facie absolute dispositions no longer being a competent form of security.58 
 
(ii) Third party rights/obligations 
 
Outside Scotland, there has been some recognition that the operation of confusio may 
properly be restricted where the interests of third parties are involved. Thus, in French law, it 
appears that the operation of confusio will be prevented by the existence of an advantage on 
or against a third party, arising from the existence of the right.59 This is broader than the 
formulation adopted in the Draft Common Frame of Reference, which excludes confusio 
(called "merger") only "if the effect would be to deprive a third person of a right",60 thus 
excluding from consideration the operation of confusio where it would extinguish a right 
otherwise enforceable against a third party. 
 Except possibly in the context of leases, on which more will be said below, there is 
no clear authority in Scots law for this exception to the operation of confusio, although the 
rule that we have already seen, that confusio does not operate where the same person becomes 
both cautioner and principal debtor, could also fit under this head. It is, however, possible that 
Bell's view, that confusio only operates "if no interest of the creditor interferes to make it 
desirable to keep up the debt",61 could be construed to accommodate this exception. It would, 
for example, allow the law to deal appropriately with the situation, commented on above, 
where either the benefited or burdened property in a servitude is occupied by a tenant under a 
lease. This exception would allow the continued enforcement of the servitude against a tenant 
of the burdened property. 
 
(iii) Permanent rights 
 
According to Gloag and Henderson, for the operation of confusio: 
 
"The obligation must be for the payment of money, and therefore a permanent right, 
such as that involved in a lease, a superiority, or a ground annual, is not 
extinguishable confusione".62 
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This passage may be criticised. We have seen, for example, that servitudes may be 
extinguished confusione, even though they are permanent rights and are not rights to payment 
of money. A lease, by contrast, is by its very definition not a permanent right. Superiorities, of 
course, no longer exist,63 and have not done so since 28 November 2004,64 but the non-
application of confusio to superiorities is generally said to arise from issues of feudal 
principle rather than the nature of confusio.65 Ground annuals do,66 meanwhile, represent a 
right to payment of money. 
 However, even though Gloag and Henderson's rationale for their exclusion cannot be 
accepted, there is authority that confusio does not apply to ground annuals. In Murray v 
Parlane's Trustee,67 the owner of land took an assignation of certain ground annuals affecting 
the land. She then directed her trustees, by trust disposition and settlement, to convey the land 
to a named person. The Inner House held that the ground annuals were not extinguished 
confusione, and continued to burden the land, in part because a ground annual is "ex facie 
irredeemable",68 and therefore forms a permanent burden on the property. 
 This reasoning is not entirely convincing, and it is not easy to see why such an 
exception should exist, whatever view is taken of confusio. On the legal necessity view, the 
absurdity of the same person being creditor and debtor is not lessened by the permanence of 
the right: quite the contrary, in fact. Equally, on the deemed discharge view, for all that a 
ground annual may be "ex facie irredeemable", it is not redemption by the debtor that is at 
issue, but discharge by the creditor. 
 In any case, the example of servitudes - also "ex facie irredeemable" - demonstrates 
that this is not a general exception. If there is indeed an exception for ground annuals, it may 
be that the true reason is found in Healy & Young's Tr v Mair's Tr.69 In that case, Lord 
Johnston explained the difference between a ground annual and a normal secured debt as 
being that, in the former case, "there is no obligation to pay a principal sum, there is only an 
obligation to pay an annuity in perpetuity".70 Indeed, one might go further, and say that a 
ground annual did not necessarily impose a personal obligation to pay any sum at all, not 
being enforceable by personal action against the present owner of the ground.71  
 On the whole, there appears to be insufficient basis for recognition of an exception to 
confusio for permanent rights. In any case, though, as already noted, any such exception 
would not be relevant to leases. 
 
(iv) Union intended to be temporary 
 
Speaking specifically of servitudes, Bell suggests that confusio will not operate, even though 
both properties belong to the same person, where "a separation or disunion may be 
anticipated".72 The suggestion, then, is that confusio does not operate when the situation is 
intended to be temporary. An example for leases would be where a tenant acquires ownership 
of the land while in the process of assigning the lease, but before the assignation is completed. 
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 There is some indication in Roman-Dutch law that confusio did not operate where the 
union was intended to be temporary. For example, Scholtens refers to a Dutch case of 1709, 
in which a servitude was held to revive when, because one property was sold on the day the 
other was bought, the two were only owned together for a few hours.73 
 The only reported Scottish case on this point appears to be Fleming v Imrie.74 In that 
case, the owners of an area of land contracted an obligation to sell the land. The land was 
subject to a heritable security. After making this agreement, but before delivery of the 
disposition to the buyer, the sellers took an assignation of the security. The Inner House held 
that confusio did not operate to extinguish the heritable security. The Lord Justice-Clerk said: 
 
"that there has been no confusion seems to me to be made out by this, that at the time 
of the acquisition of the rights to the real security there were adverse interests, which 
prevented the absolute identity of debtor and creditor...There are different rights in 
the subject which may be brought almost immediately into conflict".75 
 
In part, the Lord Justice-Clerk seems to be suggesting that, after agreeing a sale of land, but 
before the completion of the transfer, the seller is in some way not fully owner of the 
property. If this view was ever tenable, it is no longer so.76 However, there is also a 
suggestion here that the temporary nature of the situation makes a difference. 
 An exception for temporary concurrence of the interests of debtor and creditor would 
be convenient to some extent. This approach would certainly avoid the problem of an 
accidental concurrence of debtor and creditor for a brief period, for example where a group of 
companies is restructuring its affairs. In a case like the one referred to by Scholtens, it seems 
harsh to make so much dependent on what may be merely an accident of timing. 
 Fleming v Imrie is, however, a different case altogether. In that case, the agreement to 
sell the property was made in 1858. The decision in the case was dated in 1868, and even 
after that period the disposition had not yet been delivered.77 This is not a case like the one 
Scholtens mentions. Where, as in that case, the overlap is for only a few hours or days, the 
risk seems minimal. A more extended period, though, creates risks for third parties who may 
be affected by matters of which they cannot be aware. Such a rule would therefore create an 
undue level of uncertainty, and it does not seem appropriate to introduce such uncertainty for 
the benefit of parties who had it in their power to avoid the situation. In Fleming, for example, 
the seller could have delayed his acquisition of the security burdening the property until after 
the sale was completed. It is not in any case clear how it is to be judged whether separation is 
to be anticipated except after the fact, as Cusine and Paisley have pointed out.78 In the absence 
of clearer authority, Scots law is free to reject such an exception to the operation of confusio, 
and it is suggested that it should do so.79 
 
The relevance of intention 
 
The next question is whether intention is relevant to the operation of confusio. On one view, 
described by McBryde as the "common sense view",80 confusio operates automatically, 
without reference to the intention of any party. Certainly, if the legal necessity view of 
confusio is accepted, there seems no room for intention: something that is legally impossible 
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can hardly be made less so by a contrary intention. By contrast, the deemed discharge view of 
confusio does leave room for a possible role for intention, although it does not require one. 
 There is indeed support in the authorities for the view that intention is irrelevant. In 
Healy & Young's Tr v Mair's Tr,81 for example, Lord Johnston stated that confusio operated 
"ex lege and independently of intention". In Elder v Watson,82 Lord Wood, giving the opinion 
of the court, referred to "immediate extinction", suggesting that there is no role for a contrary 
intention. Again, in Colville's Trs v Marindin,83 the Lord President said that confusio occurs 
"automatically the moment that there [is] a concursus debitor and creditor in the same 
person", this occurring "ipso jure". 
 This support is not, however, unequivocal, and there have been several cases in which 
intention has been given a role. Before turning to these, though, it is necessary to deal first 
with two cases that may at first sight appear to give support to the view that intention is 
relevant but which, on closer examination, do not. 
 The first of these cases is Cuninghame v Cardross.84 In this case, land was conveyed 
to the granter’s son, subject to an obligation to pay the granter's debts. It was later argued that 
the obligation was extinguished confusione when the same person, the son, became both 
creditor and debtor under that obligation on the death of his father. However, it was 
successfully argued that the obligation was not extinguished, on the basis that the deed “must 
be interpreted according to the rational design and meaning of parties, to take effect at the 
first time the estate shall happen to divide betwixt the heirs of line and heirs of tailzie”. 
Arguably, then, this is not in fact a case of confusio at all. The succession to the right and the 
obligation was not originally divided, as the granter had only one son alive at the time of his 
death. It may be argued, therefore, that the granter’s intention was that the obligation was 
only to come into effect when the succession did divide. This is not, therefore, a case of an 
obligation surviving the coming together in the same person of the roles of creditor and 
debtor, whether on the basis of intention or otherwise. 
 The second case is Murray v Parlane's Tr.85 In this case, as we have already seen, the 
owner of land took an assignation of a ground annual affecting the land, and then directed 
trustees by trust disposition and settlement to convey the land to a named person. As we saw 
earlier, the court held that the ground annual was not extinguished confusione when the owner 
of the land acquired right to it, on the basis that a ground annual is a permanent right and ex 
facie irredeemable. However, in the course of his opinion, the Lord Justice-Clerk drew 
attention to the terms of the trust disposition and settlement, which directed the land to be 
conveyed “under burden of...[the] ground-annual...affecting it”. This, this Lord Justice-Clerk 
said, was a “distinct expression of her will”.86 Lord Rutherfurd Clark also referred to “the 
intention of the testator” as being decisive.87 However, this does not appear from context to be 
an assertion that the testator’s intention prevented the operation of confusio. Instead, the Lord 
Justice-Clerk and Lord Rutherfurd Clark appear to be saying that, confusio not having 
operated for the reasons already stated, the testator had the option of either keeping up or 
discharging the ground annual. It is at that point that intention was held to be relevant. 
 These two cases therefore give little support to the idea that intention is relevant in 
the operation of confusio. However, there are other authorities that do support this idea. 
Erskine, for example, draws a distinction based on how the creditor and debtor’s interests 
come together. Speaking in the particular context of entailed land, he says that confusio will 
not operate where the debtor takes an assignation of the creditor’s interest, this being 
“sufficient indication of the heir’s intention that [the debt] should still continue to subsist in 
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his person”.88 The same approach was taken in Fleming v Imrie,89 in which the Lord Justice-
Clerk said that the “intention of the parties to the transfer was to keep up the debts and 
securities. The form of the transaction is assignation, not receipt”,90 although this was noted 
as not being decisive. 
 Another case of intention being held relevant was the decision of the Inner House in 
McKenzie v Gordon.91 In that case, land was burdened by securities in favour of certain 
parties (collectively A). Another security was then granted to B. The owner of the land took 
assignations of the securities from A, and then conveyed them to third parties (C). The 
majority of the Inner House held that confusio had not operated. Lord Corehouse, with whom 
Lord Mackenzie concurred, appears to have based this outcome on the intention, presumed 
from the fact of taking assignations rather than discharges, to maintain the securities. It was 
presumed that the intention of the process was to benefit the owner (by maintaining the 
securities as available to secure further debt without being postponed to B’s security) rather 
than B. The Lord President, by contrast, dissented. This, he said, was a case where a 
proprietor “pays a heritable debt affecting his estate, for which debt he alone is liable out and 
out, and takes an assignation of the debt to himself. I am at a loss to see how such a debt 
should not suffer extinction confusione".92 
 In Welsh v Barstow,93 decided in the same year, intention was likewise held to be 
relevant. In that case, an argument was accepted that confusio did not apply where the 
circumstances did not show that the right was acquired by the debtor “with the purpose and 
intention of extinguishing the debt”. 
 Subsequent to this, there was in McKenzie v Gordon an appeal to the House of 
Lords.94 In this appeal, the same outcome was reached. Unfortunately, though, the House of 
Lords chose to ignore the issues as argued before the Court of Session. Instead, the Lord 
Chancellor decided the case on the basis of an apparent English rule that, if C provided the 
money to pay off the debts to A and induce A to assign the securities, C was entitled to stand 
in A’s position. The position in Scots law was assumed without argument or reference to 
authority to be the same.95 This is regrettable, in part for reasons that need hardly be spelled 
out, but also because it means that there appears to be no decision above Inner House level on 
the role of intention in confusio. 
 The question seems to be open. This writer would suggest that intention should have 
no role in confusio. As well as reflecting the current understanding of the position, this would 
reduce uncertainty in the application of the law. After all, where there are competing third 
party rights, as in McKenzie v Gordon, it is not at all clear how such a third party is meant to 
judge the intention of the party who has become both creditor and debtor. 
 
Confusio and leases 
 
We have seen then that, while it is accepted as a general rule that a right will be extinguished 
when the holder of it and the person subject to it are the same person, there is a lack of clarity 
on certain points. Confusio will not operate unless the interests of creditor and debtor are held 
in the same capacity and it has been argued also that confusio should not operate where this 
would extinguish a right held by or against a third party. There is also some authority for the 
exclusion of confusio in the case of so-called permanent rights and in the case where the 
union of creditor and debtor is intended to be temporary, but it has been argued that these 
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supposed exceptions should not apply. There is also some authority for a role for intention 
but, again, it has been argued that this should not be relevant.96 
 It has been suggested also that the basis on which confusio operates are unclear. Two 
different views of the matter have been considered, one called here the legal necessity view 
and the other the deemed discharge view. It has been suggested that the latter provides a 
better basis for understanding the law. We turn now to the application of confusio to leases. 
 It should be said at the outset that the discussion below assumes that the rule will be 
the same for both registered and unregistered leases. Although Halliday appears to draw a 
distinction,97 recording of a lease in the Register of Sasines or its registration in the Land 
Register does not appear to make any difference to the nature of the lease. Nothing implying 
any such change appears in the Registration of Leases (Scotland) Act 1857, which introduced 
the facility of recording leases. For example, a lease that would not otherwise have been valid 
is not rendered so by being recorded.98 While, as has been noted earlier, it may be convenient 
to exclude registered real rights from the operation of confusio, there is no basis in principle 
for making an exception on that ground. 
 At first sight, leases do appear to be a promising candidate for extinction confusione 
when the same person becomes both landlord and tenant. We have seen that there is no 
objection to the application of confusio to real rights and, in any case, a lease is real only by 
statute. According to the common law, a lease is merely a contract. As long as the two 
interests are held in the same capacity, and no third party interests are affected (an issue 
which is considered below), then there seems no reason to exclude leases from the operation 
of confusio. 
 On the other hand, it has been said judicially that confusio "ought not to be extended 
in application out of mere deference to legal logic."99 If there should be an absence of 
authority directly on the point, that may be a relevant consideration. We shall see below 
whether that is the case here. It must be acknowledged, though, that certain writers have 
denied the applicability of confusio to leases. 
 As noted earlier, Gloag and Henderson state that a lease will not be extinguished 
confusione on the same person becoming both landlord and tenant, on the basis that a lease is 
a "permanent right".100 Some criticism has been made of this position above. However, it is 
necessary now to look more closely at the basis for the position taken by Gloag and 
Henderson. In support of their view, they cite Lord Blantyre v Dunn.101 Curiously, this case 
has also been cited in support of the contrary proposition.102 
 The facts of Lord Blantyre v Dunn were as follows. A tenant held land under two 
long leases, each with more than 200 years remaining. The tenant then acquired the landlord's 
interest. A dispute then arose over the basis for the composition payable to the feudal superior 
of the lands.103 This would be based on the rental value of the lands. The question was 
whether this was the market rent or the rent payable under the leases, which was much lower. 
The superior argued that there was no current rent payable, the leases having been 
extinguished confusione. The Lord Ordinary agreed. The result of the Lord Ordinary's 
decision was upheld in the Inner House. However, the judges of the Inner House were in 
some disagreement as to the basis of the decision. Of the four judges, the Lord President and 
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Lord Deas considered it unnecessary to decide whether the lease itself had been extinguished 
confusione. They held that it was enough to decide that the rent obligation was extinguished 
as long as the same party was both landlord and tenant. There being therefore no rent payable, 
composition would be based on the market rent of the lands. Of the remaining two, Lord 
Curriehill said "I think that these leases themselves became extinct."104 However, he went on 
to say: 
 
"it would be of no consequence, in the present question, whether or not the right of 
lease might be held to have subsisted to some effect after the purchase; because...at 
all events, no rent was payable in virtue of it".105 
 
Lord Curriehill, therefore, agreed that it was not necessary to decide whether the lease had 
been extinguished by confusio. Arguably, then, his view that confusio had operated was 
obiter. Only Lord Ivory unequivocally supported the view that confusio had operated.106 
 At most, then, only two of the four judges in the Inner House in Lord Blantyre v 
Dunn were clearly of the view that confusio had operated. On the other hand, though, neither 
of the other judges rejected the idea. This case certainly provides no support for the idea that 
confusio does not apply to leases. The decision weighs rather to the contrary, although of 
course not conclusively so.107 The judges of the Inner House can be described as being at least 
sympathetic to the idea of extinction of the lease confusione, although their decision was 
confined to the question of the effect on the rent. It is interesting to note here that, in so 
deciding, the Inner House was closer to the legal necessity view of confusio rather than the 
deemed discharge view. As Lord Kinnear pointed out in Motherwell v Manwell,108 the court 
in Lord Blantyre v Dunn held that there was no rent payable, with the result that composition 
was payable based on market rent. If the decision had been based on confusio as a deemed 
payment or a deemed discharge of the obligation to pay, that would have been a finding that 
there was a rent payable and, as Lord Kinnear says, "the judgment must have been the very 
reverse of that actually pronounced." 
Halliday also argues that confusio does not apply to leases.109 He gives a number of 
reasons for taking this view. Unfortunately, though, it is not clear that his view is justified by 
the reasons he gives. 
First, he refers to the dictum of Lord Kinnear in Motherwell v Manwell,110 quoted 
earlier, that "confusion does not operate either payment or discharge. It prevents the 
possibility of a debt arising". From this, says Halliday, it "follows that confusio does not 
discharge or extinguish the lease: it simply suspends the obligation of payment or rent while 
the landlord and tenant are the same person." 
The response to this is in two parts. First, as was argued above, it is not certain that 
Lord Kinnear's view of confusio, based on the legal necessity view, is correct. Second, even if 
Lord Kinnear's view is accepted, Halliday's conclusion does not appear to follow from it: 
Lord Kinnear's argument – which, it will be remembered, was not made in relation to leases – 
seems just as applicable to the extinction of the lease itself as it is to the rent obligation. 
Indeed, arguably the absence of a continuing rent obligation is inconsistent with the idea of a 
continuing lease, rent being one of the essential elements of a lease. 
Halliday's second argument is that: 
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"Where a contract between two parties which creates a debtor-creditor obligation 
involves also some other element, such as the creation of a right of property, confusio 
does not operate to extinguish that other right". 
 
The examples Halliday gives are feu rights and rights of ground annual, citing as authority 
Earl of Zetland v Glover Incorporation111 and Healy & Young's Tr v Mair's Trs112 
respectively. We have already seen that this does not appear to be the ratio of Healy & 
Young's Tr v Mair's Trs. As to Earl of Zetland v Glover Incorporation, that case concerned a 
vassal whose title included salmon fishing rights, and who then acquired the superiority title, 
which did not. He then consolidated these titles. The House of Lords held that the salmon 
fishing rights were not extinguished by the process. Feudal rights were a well-established case 
where confusio did not operate. This can be justified on the basis that feus could only be 
extinguished by following certain procedures. This is the approach taken, for example, by 
Lord Ivory in Lord Blantyre v Dunn: 
 
"I do not think any cases which refer to distinct feudal estates can regulate the present 
question. These estates require the observance of certain technical forms, both for 
their constitution and for their extinction."113 
 
There is also a theoretical justification. While a lease or a servitude is a burden on the owner's 
right in the land, the same was not true of the rights of vassal and feudal superior. It is long 
settled that, instead of the vassal's right (the dominium utile) being a burden on the 
superiority, ownership was divided between superior and vassal.114 Both had their own 
separate rights of ownership in the property. Certainly there were also obligations owed by 
one to the other, and those would be extinguished as performance fell due when the same 
person was both superior and vassal, but it makes no sense to talk of the vassal's interest itself 
as being extinguished by that fact. 
 But in any case, Earl of Zetland v Glover Incorporation was not concerned with that 
issue, but with the effect of consolidation of superiority and feu on salmon fishing rights held 
by the vassal. The House of Lords' decision, that the salmon fishing rights were unaffected, is 
only to be expected when it is remembered that the right to fish for salmon is not a pertinent 
of ownership of the land. Instead, it is separately owned as a legal separate tenement.115 It is 
an entirely separate item of property. Suppose that there had been a vassal, A, holding an area 
of land. Half of the land was held of one superior, B, and the other half was held of another 
superior, C. A then acquired B's superiority title and consolidated it with his dominium utile 
title. It can hardly be supposed that, by this act, A's rights over the part of the land held of C 
would have been extinguished. That would be absurd. Yet that was, in effect, what the House 
of Lords was asked to hold in Earl of Zetland v Glover Incorporation, which it refused to do. 
For present purposes, though, the point is that the case is of no relevance to the issue under 
consideration here. It is certainly no authority for the proposition that a real right in land is not 
extinguished confusione when the same person becomes both holder of the right and owner of 
the land. 
 Thirdly, Halliday argues that the only authority for extinction of a lease in these 
circumstances is Campbell v McKinnon.116 That case involved building plots in Tobermory. 
Certain individuals had taken 99 year leases of building plots. The leases included a right of 
pasturage on land adjoining the village. Some of these individuals then acquired ownership of 
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the building plots, but without the pasturage rights. The court held that the pasturage rights 
did not survive the process. 
The decision has been criticised. Gloag "doubted whether this result can be 
reconciled, on any intelligible principle, with the decision in" Earl of Zetland v Glover 
Incorporation.117 As we have already seen, however, the decision in Earl of Zetland v Glover 
Incorporation is based on quite different principles. For the moment, though, it is enough to 
note that consideration of the decision in Campbell v McKinnon shows that Halliday is 
incorrect to suggest that there is no other authority for the proposition that a lease is 
extinguished when the same person becomes both landlord and tenant, the court in that case 
having been influenced by the views of Stair, Erskine and Craig. It is to these that we shall 
turn next. 
 
Older discussions 
 
In the passage cited in Campbell v McKinnon, Erskine states that "the same person cannot be 
landlord and tenant".118 Craig is to the same effect: "no man can be owner and lessee at the 
same time".119 At first sight, this looks promising for the view that confusio applies to leases, 
and in particular it is encouraging for the legal necessity view of confusio. However, the 
context of these observations casts a different light on them. Neither Erskine nor Craig is 
talking about confusio at all. The text quoted in each case comes instead from a discussion of 
the extinction of leases by renunciation. The term confusio is nowhere used. Thus, Craig says: 
 
"a tenant who, during the currency of his tack, acquires the property of the subject by 
virtue of an alienation thereof in his favour loses all benefit by the tack...The principle 
is that the acquisition of the property of the subject by the tenant implies a 
renunciation on his part of the tack."120 
 
Erskine is to the same effect,121 as is Stair.122 
 These views may then be seen as being more helpful to the deemed discharge view of 
confusio, but this is true only up to a point. If Stair is concerned here with confusio, that 
seems difficult to reconcile with his view, considered earlier, that confusio operates only to 
suspend obligations. Here Stair seems to be saying that the lease is extinguished altogether 
when the tenant acquires ownership of the land. Moreover, Stair, Erskine and Craig are not 
talking of a deemed renunciation of the lease, but a presumed one. There is a distinction 
between these. If a tenant is deemed to have renounced the lease, it is not necessarily the case 
that there has actually been any such renunciation; rather, the tenant is treated as if he or she 
had renounced the lease. By contrast, a presumed renunciation is one that is presumed to have 
actually happened, which presumption may, it must be supposed, be rebutted. On the other 
hand, it may be that this issue is more one of terminology than of practical significance. There 
are, as we have seen, exceptions to the operation of confusio. These can equally well be seen 
as cases where the presumption of renunciation is rebutted. Either way, with the support of 
Stair, Erskine and Craig, the decision in Campbell v McKinnon seems entirely adequate to 
justify the view that a lease is extinguished when the tenant acquires ownership of the 
property. 
 Because, on this view, the lease simply ceases to exist when the tenant acquires the 
landlord's interest, there is no room for its revival if the property is alienated. However, all 
three writers state that the lease will revive if the title acquired by the tenant is reduced: 
                                      
117 W M Gloag, The Law of Contract: A Treatise on the Principles of Contract in the Law of Scotland 
(2nd edn, Edinburgh: Green, 1929), p. 727. 
118 Erskine 2.6.44. 
119 T Craig, The Jus Feudale (J A Clyde tr, Edinburgh: W Hodge, 1934), 2.10.7. 
120 Craig, Jus Feudale 2.10.7. 
121 Erskine 2.6.44. 
122 Stair 2.9.36. 
 
"because the implied renunciation...is only provisional, not to take place if 
the...heritable right should prove ineffectual to him".123 
 
Stair states the same rule,124 as does Craig, commenting that "a transaction which has been 
reduced [is] regarded as if it had never taken place".125 Thus, in McDougal v Campbell,126 a 
party took a lease from his father, who then subsequently conveyed the land to him. The 
conveyance was later reduced. Following the father's death, his heir raised an action for 
removing against him. It was held that the lease continued to subsist. 
 It is notable that these writers are only considering the case where the tenant acquires 
the landlord's interest, but not the converse case of acquisition by the landlord of the tenant's 
interest. Rankine considers this to be, if anything, an even clearer case. In such a situation, he 
argues, "there can be little if any doubt that the lease is extinguished",127 this extinction 
occurring on the ground of confusio which, it will be remembered, Rankine considers to be 
equivalent to renunciation of the lease. Certainly, there seems to be little basis for 
distinguishing the two situations. In both cases, the same person has ended up as both 
landlord and tenant, and may normally be supposed to have little continuing use for the lease.  
 
Modern cases 
 
Contrary to the expectation from principle, therefore, there is little basis in the institutional 
writers for the view that confusio applies to leases. Instead, the view taken there is that the 
tenant is presumed to have been renounced when the same person becomes both landlord and 
tenant. In practical terms, this is consistent with the deemed discharge view of confusio. 
However, the institutional writers do not themselves make that connection, and it defies belief 
to suppose that they would not have made that connection had it been there to be made in the 
law as at stood when they were writing. To that extent, then, Halliday's view has some 
justification. Nonetheless, his view is misleading, for Campbell v McKinnon is not in any 
sense a rogue case. The decision of the Inner House in that case is supported by the views of 
Stair, Erskine and Craig, and provides ample justification for the view that a lease is 
extinguished when the tenant acquires the landlord's interest, albeit that the extinction is based 
on a presumed renunciation rather than on confusio. 
 Thus matters could have rested, but for a series of more recent decisions beginning 
with Clydesdale Bank plc v Davidson.128 In that case, three co-owners of an area of land 
purported to grant a lease in favour of one of their number. The lease was held by the House 
of Lords to be invalid. The case was therefore not one in which the same person had acquired 
both landlord and tenant's interests under a lease. Rather, it was a case where an attempt was 
made by one person to grant a right in his own favour. This is something well established as 
incompetent,129 the only issue in Clydesdale Bank plc v Davidson being whether the presence 
of co-owners made a difference to the question. Nonetheless, the following was given by 
Lord Hope as the basis for the decision: 
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"...it is not possible for a person to have two real rights in the same property at the 
same time. This is because of the principle of confusio, by which the lesser right is 
absorbed into the greater right and is extinguished."130 
 
Because of the reference to impossibility, and because of the link made with the impossibility 
of constituting an obligation in one’s own favour, this seems more consistent with the legal 
necessity view of confusio. However, this does not appear to be the ratio of the case. The 
majority of the court simply concurred with Lord Clyde, whose view does not seem to be 
based on confusio at all. Indeed, he accepts that there is a contractual relationship between the 
“tenant” and the other two co-owners.131 Instead, his view appears to be based, not on 
confusio, but on the “tenant’s” right to occupy being attributable to his right of co-ownership 
rather than the lease.132 
 Clydesdale Bank plc v Davidson was not the first modern case in which the operation 
of confusio with respect to leases was discussed. For example, in Sutherland v Sutherland133 
and Cameron v Bank of Scotland,134 it was held that crofting leases were extinguished when 
the tenant acquired ownership of the land. However, Clydesdale Bank plc v Davidson has 
been seen as settling the question. For example, in Serup v McCormack,135 the Scottish Land 
Court held that a lease was extinguished confusione when the tenant became a pro indiviso 
proprietor of the subjects, on the basis of Clydesdale Bank plc v Davidson. Lord Hope’s view 
was also followed in Howgate Shopping Centre Ltd v Catercraft Services Ltd,136 about which 
more will be said below. 
By contrast, the decision in B G Hamilton Ltd v Ready Mixed Concrete (Scotland) 
Ltd,137 only a year later than Clydesdale Bank plc v Davidson, is a little surprising. In B G 
Hamilton Ltd, the tenants under a 999-year lease registered an a non domino disposition in 
their own favour.138 The landlords had the Land Register rectified to restore the former 
position, and then sought to have it declared that, by registering an a non domino disposition 
of the property, the tenants had impliedly renounced their lease. The Lord Ordinary held, 
however, that this was not the effect of the tenants' actions. An a non domino disposition may 
be used as a legitimate device, for example to resolve title problems, and so it does not imply 
the giving up of any right. In any case, said the Lord Ordinary, even had implied renunciation 
been the effect of the a non domino disposition, the lease would have revived on rectification 
of the Land Register. 
This final point seems amply justified by the views of Stair, Erskine and Craig, 
discussed above. Curiously, though, the Lord Ordinary seeks to distinguish confusio and 
implied renunciation. As the case was argued on the basis of renunciation: 
 
"It is accordingly unnecessary for the purposes of this action to discuss the possible 
application of confusio where, for example, a tenant, by the registration of a 
proprietorial title to the subjects, acquires under s 3 of the Land Registration 
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(Scotland) Act 1979 a real right to them, under exclusion of indemnity in terms of s 
12(2) of the Act."139 
 
It is not easy to follow the Lord Ordinary's reasoning here, for this is exactly what had 
happened in the case. A non domino or not, under the law in force at the time registration of 
the disposition gave the tenants ownership of the property, due to the terms of section 3 of the 
Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979.140 Clydesdale Bank plc v Davidson does not appear to 
have been cited to the court. 
 
Where there is a sub-lease or other subordinate right 
 
So far, we have considered only the simple situation, where no third party interests are 
concerned. There may, however, be a sub-lease or other subordinate right, such as a right in 
security affecting the lease. If the head lease is extinguished confusione, it is not immediately 
apparent how a sub-lease can survive, especially if the view is taken that the sub-lease is a 
right in the head lease itself.141 On that view, it would seem that the sub-lease must fall with 
the head lease. This is certainly a possible view to take of the situation, and appears to be the 
position taken in South Africa.142 In the same way, in Scots law, a sub-lease will fall if the 
head lease is reduced143 or is extinguished by irritancy.144 
There is one case dealing with the issue of confusio in these circumstances. Howgate 
Shopping Centre Ltd v Catercraft Services Ltd145 was concerned with the interpretation of a 
rent review clause in a sub-lease of a unit of a shopping centre. The pursuers had acquired in 
1997, by assignation from the previous tenants, the lease of the whole shopping centre, and 
then in 2001 the tenants of the unit in question assigned their lease to the pursuers. The 
defenders were the sub-tenants of the unit. The defenders argued that the lease of the unit, 
acquired by the pursuers in 2001, was extinguished confusione as the pursuers were at that 
time already the head tenants under the lease of the shopping centre. The Lord Ordinary held 
that the lease was extinguished confusione, but that this did not affect the continued existence 
of the sub-lease. This appears to have been on the basis that, where there is a sub-lease, the 
head tenant has a continuing contractual relationship with the sub-tenant.146 The Lord 
Ordinary endorsed Halliday's view that: 
 
"It makes no sense that valid sub-leases or heritable securities created over registered 
leases can be extinguished by the lessee acquiring the property, a transaction to which 
neither the subtenants or [sic] the heritable creditors are parties."147  
 
The problem with this is that Halliday is assuming here that confusio, if it operated at all, 
would extinguish the sub-lease. That is for him a reason for holding that it doesn't operate. 
McDonald assumes the same and, for the same reason, argues that confusio does not operate 
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at all where the lease is affected by a sub-lease or a heritable security.148 Halliday seems in the 
passage quoted to be referring to the idea, discussed earlier, that confusio will not operate 
where it would extinguish a right against a third party or a right held by a third party. Thus, 
while Halliday’s view provides a justification for the survival of the sub-lease, the extinction 
of the head lease is a different question entirely. Further, as Reid and Gretton point out, the 
approach taken by the Lord Ordinary runs into difficulties in the case of heritable securities: 
“it makes no sense to say that what were securities over the lease become securities over the 
property itself.”149 
 Nonetheless, justification for the Lord Ordinary’s view may be found in the deemed 
discharge view of confusio. The argument would be that, where the landlord acquires the 
tenant’s interest or vice versa, that is treated as a renunciation of the lease by the tenant. In 
such a case, notwithstanding the extinction of the head lease, the landlord is bound to 
recognise any valid sub-lease, which thus will continue in operation.150 This allows the 
conclusion that a sub-lease will survive the extinction confusione of the head lease.151 
There seems to be no authority on the effect of renunciation of a lease on a security 
burdening that lease. However, it may be supposed that the law would refuse effect to the 
renunciation in these circumstances, unless the creditor consented, which consent would 
presumably be dependent on either fulfilment of the obligation secured or the grant of a new 
security. On the argument here, the same would apply in cases where the landlord and 
tenant’s interests came into the same hands.152 Confusio would simply not operate. This is 
consistent with the view, expressed earlier, that confusio should not operate where it would 
extinguish a right held by or against a third party. 
 
Where rights not co-extensive 
 
Gloag suggests: 
 
"Where a party has two rights to a particular subject, one wider or more extensive 
than the other...it would seem doubtful whether the principle of confusio, or any 
extension of it, excludes him from founding on the lower or less extensive right, 
should that right have incidents appertaining to it which the higher right does not 
possess."153 
 
Gloag criticises the decision in Campbell v McKinnon154 on this ground. As we have seen, 
though, the decision was not based on the doctrine of confusio, but on implied renunciation. 
Despite the stated reluctance of the judges of the Inner House,155 the decision seems entirely 
reasonable on those grounds. This was a case in which a number of individuals had possessed 
plots in Tobermory under leases which gave them rights to take peat, to take stone and to 
graze one cow each on land retained by the landlord. When some of them accepted feu grants 
that in substance reproduced the first two rights but omitted the third - intentionally, said Lord 
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Curriehill156 - it is difficult not to see in this an intention to give up the status of tenant and 
replace it with the status of vassal. 
 Exceptions may certainly be permitted. This is, after all, only a presumed 
renunciation. Cauder v Hamilton157 gives an example of a case in which a lease is not 
extinguished on the acquisition of ownership by the tenant, in circumstances where the lease 
gives rights that are in some respect more extensive than those of the owner of the land. It is 
notable that, again, confusio is not mentioned. In that case, land was conveyed to an existing 
tenant, subject to a liferent reserved in favour of another person. It was held that the lease was 
not extinguished confusione, thus preserving the tenant's right to natural possession of the 
land, which he would not have had solely as owner, due to the existence of the liferent. This is 
a sensible outcome. It makes no sense to say that a tenant in such circumstances must choose 
between a temporary right, with a right to natural possession, but subject to payment of 
rent,158 and a permanent right, but with no present right to natural possession of the land. 
 In light of the more recent cases, though, it appears that we are now to think in terms 
of confusio in such cases. Thus the older authorities appear superseded, although it may be 
possible to accommodate them on the basis of the deemed renunciation view. Certainly Gloag 
is already talking, at the date of the quoted text (1929), in terms of confusio. It is true that his 
authority for the position taken is Earl of Zetland v Glover Incorporation,159 which, as we 
have already seen, is also not concerned with confusio. However, the general idea expressed 
seems sound. It was suggested earlier that confusio should not operate when it would 
extinguish either a right against a third party or a right held by a third party, which would 
seem to be a sensible limitation on the doctrine.. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, consideration has been given both to the nature and application of confusio 
generally, and also to the application of the doctrine to leases specifically. As far as the 
general application of confusio is concerned, it is clear that it will not apply where the 
positions of creditor and debtor are held in different capacities, and it has been argued also 
that it should not apply where its operation would extinguish a right held by or against a third 
party. It has also been suggested that confusio is based on a deemed discharge or renunciation 
of the obligation by the creditor, a position which, it has been argued, allows the decision in 
Howgate Shopping Centre Ltd v Catercraft Services Ltd160 to be justified. On the other hand, 
it has been argued that confusio should apply even where the right is permanent in character 
or where the coincidence of the roles of debtor and creditor in the same person is to be 
temporary, and that intention should have no role. It cannot be pretended, however, that these 
matters are free from doubt. There is a great deal that is uncertain, with conflicting positions 
finding justification in the authorities. The case law shows attempts to look for reasons to 
exclude confusio whenever its operation is inconvenient, attempts which are sometimes 
successful and sometimes not. When it comes to registered real rights in land, we have seen 
that there are also practical difficulties. The Draft Common Frame of Reference has 
characterised confusio (there called “merger”) as “a widely recognised rule of evident 
utility”.161 With respect, this view appears questionable, given these doubts and complexities. 
 As far as leases are concerned, there is surprisingly little clear authority on the 
question. The earlier position seems to have been that leases were extinguished when the 
same person became both landlord and tenant, at least when this occurred by the tenant 
acquiring ownership. However, this was based, not on confusio, but on a presumed 
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renunciation of the lease. While the decision in Lord Blantyre v Dunn162 was consistent with 
the idea that confusio applied to leases, it was not until the late twentieth century that there 
was direct authority justifying that view. The position now seems settled, however, that leases 
are susceptible to extinction through the operation of confusio. 
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